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Abstract 
This paper explores the interaction between bioethics and law in the theatre of the 
courtroom, with particular reference to English law. No matter what some judges say, 
the courtroom has long been a location in which law and bioethics interact, not least 
in seminal health care law cases such as Re A (Minors) (Conjoined Twins: 
Separation [2000] and R v Arthur [1981]. Judge-made law has made some positive 
contributions to the shaping of bioethics as a discipline, providing a real-world testing 
ground for moral arguments, issuing the judicial ‘products’ with which bioethics 
engages, and emphasising the importance of observing due process. At the same 
time, the courtroom is an adversarial arena, not always ideally suited to the 
resolution of ethical conflict, and its concern with actions that satisfy attainable 
standards can fall short of the aspirations set in philosophical ethics. Indeed, 
sometimes the judges misinterpret or wholly neglect the ethical dimensions of the 
case at hand. So much of what judges do involves orchestrated framing, the 
manipulation of legal concepts, interpretation (of the facts of the case, the story of 
legal precedent and of the particular ethical dilemma) and translation (of ethical 
issues into law's discourse). Whether they like it or not, the judges are interpreting 
and responding to the voice of bioethics alongside the voice of the law in their 
attempts to reach the 'right' judgment and in the face of the theatre surrounding 
cases involving bioethical controversy. The end result may be distorting because 
bioethical theory is misinterpreted or the voice of bioethics becomes obscured 
because of the drama of the case. But this is not to claim that bioethics has some 
access to the ‘right’ or ‘true’ response to the case at hand. Indeed, neither bioethics 
nor law can necessarily claim superiority or access to the ‘truth’ of the matter. We 
nevertheless argue that each will be likely to gain greater insight by opening a 
dialogue with the other, telling and re-telling the story, so that the voices of one 
forum can carry over into the other. 
 
Introduction 
Both bioethics and law have valid (and invalid) ways of telling stories. They can 
sometimes tell these stories with one another, thereby enriching the worldview of 
each. Judge-made law has made some positive contributions to the shaping of 
bioethics as a discipline, providing a real-world testing ground for moral arguments, 
issuing the judicial ‘products’ with which bioethics engages, and emphasising the 
importance of observing due process. And bioethics can have a positive impact on 
law when law engages with, for example, the principle of respect for autonomy. But, 
importantly, bioethics and law each has its own domain (and associated language 
and ‘voice’) and, on occasion, this can lead to obscuration and disharmony. The 
courtroom is an adversarial arena, not always ideally suited to the resolution of 
ethical conflict, and its concern with actions that satisfy attainable standards can fall 
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short of the aspirations set in philosophical ethics. Indeed, sometimes the ethical 
dimensions of the case at hand are misinterpreted or wholly neglected in the 
courtroom. So much of what judges do involves interpretation (of the facts of the 
case, the story of legal precedent and of the particular ethical dilemma) and 
translation (of ethical issues into law's discourse). Likewise, bioethics involves its 
own narrative discourse; real life situations are interpreted into substantive ethical 
controversies. Consequently, whilst both bioethics and law can reveal more of the 
story than one alone, the presence of narrative construction in both means that there 
is no one ‘truth’ but, rather, numerous interpretations of the critical scenario. 
 
This paper explores the interaction between bioethics and law in the specific theatre 
of the courtroom. No matter what some judges say, the courtroom has long been a 
location in which law and bioethics interact, not least in seminal health care law 
cases such as Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 
147 and R v Arthur (1981) 12 BMLR 1. By way of a case study, the paper first 
argues that the voice of bioethics in the courtroom can be obscured because of the 
drama of the case. Secondly, however, it acknowledges that the voice of bioethics 
will sometimes transfer through to the courtroom and law, both covertly and overtly. 
Moreover, thirdly, we will suggest that a reciprocal transfer can also be detected, 
when we hear echoes of law’s products, processes and practices in bioethics. 
Finally, through an exploration of narrative construction and interpretation in law and 
bioethics, we argue that there is no one truth but, rather, that the voices of law and 
bioethics offer multiple narratives of cases involving bioethical conflict – and that, 
accordingly, each field can benefit by ensuring that it is ready to receive the insights 
the other has to offer. 
 
Drama and the doctor in the dock 
In 1981, highly respected paediatrician Dr Leonard Arthur faced trial for the murder 
of John Pearson, a baby with Down’s syndrome. The charge was subsequently 
reduced to attempted murder and, at the end of the trial, he was acquitted. According 
to newspaper reports (Osman Ferriman and Timmins, 1981: 1), there were cries of 
‘Thank God’ from the public gallery as the verdict was announced. The Down’s 
Children’s Association expressed fears that the case would cause more parents to 
reject children with Down’s and be ‘sufficient reason to let them die’ (Ferriman, 1981: 
3). The subject matter of the case, a doctor dedicated to caring for children charged 
with a baby’s murder, is certainly dramatic. It is thus unsurprising that Dr Arthur’s 
case attracted much media attention. It gave rise to a series of challenging moral 
problems, numerous bioethical papers and a whole book, Raanan Gillon’s 
Philosophical Medical Ethics, in 1986. But, as we will see, the responses of the 
medical profession and the judge’s directions to the jury suggest that, in such high 
profile criminal law cases, fundamental ethical issues are evaded and hidden under 
the cloak of professional definitions of proper medical treatment. Thus, the voice of 
the medical profession joins with the voice of law to mask the voice of bioethics. 
 
The charge against Dr Arthur arose from his management of the baby, who died 69 
hours after he was born. The post mortem revealed that he had died of 
bronchopneumonia and a toxic level of a powerful painkiller was found in his blood 
(Osman, 1981: 2). During a police interview, Dr Arthur stated: ‘I am fully responsible, 
no one else. I do not want to be a martyr and I do not want the nurses brought into it’ 
(ibid). That initial reaction helped shape the image of a conscientious doctor caught 
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in the wheels of the criminal law. There was no suggestion that Dr Arthur had any 
venal motive. Although he may have been wrong (at least legally) in the care he 
provided, he did not have the appearance of a ‘bad’ man.  
 
In a contemporary newspaper report, it is stated that the baby’s mother ‘rejected the 
child because it was mentally retarded’ (ibid). Following discussion with both parents, 
Dr Arthur wrote on the nursing notes ‘Parents do not wish to survive. Nursing care 
only’. He prescribed 5 milligrams of dihydrocodeine to be administered every four 
hours. The prosecution alleged that this drug would have suppressed the baby’s 
appetite and repressed his ability to breathe independently. In prescribing an 
unnecessary drug and withholding food, the Crown argued, Dr Arthur sought to bring 
about the baby’s death at the parents’ request. The defence contended that Dr 
Arthur’s prescription of dihydrocodeine and the alleged withholding of food and 
treatment amounted to acceptable medical practice. They were too remote from the 
death to amount to the actus reus of attempted murder and Dr Arthur had no 
intention to bring about John Pearson’s death. Rather, these measures were a 
‘holding’ tactic, so that the baby’s condition could be reviewed and in case the 
mother changed her mind. 
 
Whilst it was the Crown’s case that John Pearson had been a healthy baby, save for 
Down’s Syndrome, the defence produced slides which showed that the baby had 
serious brain and lung damage.  And cross-examination of witnesses revealed that 
the baby had lost no weight during his brief life. Therefore, he had not been starved 
to death. There was thus a lack of reliable evidence that Dr Arthur’s management 
was a significant contributory factor in causing the baby’s death, so the murder 
charge was withdrawn and the prosecution then pursued a charge of attempted 
murder ((1981) 12 BMLR 1, 9-10). The prosecution’s flawed telling of the story must 
have impacted on the jury, especially since the case against Dr Arthur for attempted 
murder fared no better. There was no apparent evidence that Dr Arthur knew that the 
baby had numerous abnormalities when he prescribed dihydrocodeine and 
instructed that only nursing care be given. On the evidence available, at most all that 
could be suggested was that he might have considered the possibility that because 
the baby had Down’s syndrome, he could have had further impairments. 
Notwithstanding the destruction of the prosecution’s case, the ethical issues 
remained exactly the same. Although expressed too simply, the central question of 
principle remained: did John Pearson have the same rights to life-sustaining care as 
a baby born without Down’s?  
 
In directing the jury, Farquharson J stated: ‘I imagine you will think long and hard 
before deciding that doctors, of the eminence that we have heard, representing to 
you what medical ethics are, and apparently have been over a period of time in that 
great profession, have evolved standards which amount to committing crime’ (ibid, 
17). It may seem that the judge comes close to suggesting that doctors define ethics 
and the boundaries of crime are set by these ethics, as long as the defendant doctor 
has no apparent venal motive. But just before this sentence, he reminded the jury 
that the medical profession’s ethics cannot, alone, ensure the non-criminality of an 
act or omission. Earlier in the directions, he said that doctors are not given ‘extra 
protection’ from the criminal law (ibid, 4). Yet, given the weight of the expert 




Four eminent experts gave evidence for the defence to the effect that Dr Arthur’s 
management of John Pearson fell within the bounds of acceptable medical conduct. 
According to his peers’ testimonies, Dr Arthur had done no wrong.  That said, the 
evidence reveals uncertainty as to whether all medical professionals would have 
considered Dr Arthur’s management appropriate. One of the expert witnesses said: 
‘[i]f a doctor puts such a child on a regime which will inevitably end with its death that 
could be described as taking steps. I would not do it myself, but in this extremely 
grey area doctors may arrive at inconsistent decisions’ (ibid, 15). Another considered 
what D Arthur did fell ‘within acceptable paediatric policy’ (ibid, 16). Although the 
professional evidence was not overwhelmingly supportive, neither was it 
condemnatory. 
 
Alongside the possible seeds of doubt this evidence may have sowed in the jury’s 
minds, prominence was attached throughout to Dr Arthur’s good character. In the 
concluding paragraph of his directions, the judge noted that ‘seldom in a court could 
one have heard so many testaments to a man’s good character’ (ibid, 18). He went 
on to say that this did not make the doctor incapable of committing a crime, but he 
ended with the following statement: ‘in a case of this kind, when we are talking about 
medical attitudes and treatment, his own career must stand him in good stead, as to 
whether he is a man who would do what the prosecution submit he has done’ (ibid, 
16). 
 
Essentially, the jury were asked: was Leonard Arthur a bad man? It was the man and 
not the (other) ethical issues that shaped the trial. Further, it might seem that, in a 
sense, the child was on trial too. The judge described the baby as a ‘mongol’ and ‘it’, 
and accepted the bleakest of prognoses for the life of a child with Down’s (ibid, 3; 
Huxtable, 2007: 110-2). Mason and Laurie dismiss Arthur as being poor precedent 
and telling us nothing ultimately about the law relating to the treatment of severely 
disabled infants (Mason and McCall, 2011: 479-80). They are right (cf. Huxtable, 
2007: 125-6). Later cases heard in the Family Division, such as Re J (a minor) 
(medical treatment) [1993] Fam 15, give much more coherence to the law relating to 
the care of very sick neonates than Dr Arthur’s trial (Mason and Laurie, 2011: 481-8). 
The trial – and no doubt others (e.g. R v. Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687; R v. Adams 
[1957] Crim LR 365) – reveals that when the criminal law intervenes, drama can 
obscure the voice of bioethics in the courtroom.  
 
The voice of bioethics in the law? 
Even beyond the criminal law, there is reason to doubt that the voice of bioethics is 
heard sufficiently when bioethical conflict transfers from the clinic to the courtroom. 
The courts will sometimes hear from amici curiae, intervening parties and others who 
seek to advance distinctive principled positions: for example, the Pro-Life Alliance, 
Care Not Killing, Dignity and Choice in Dying and the British Humanist Association 
have all been involved in recent proceedings (e.g. Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: 
Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147; R (on the application of Purdy) v DPP [2009] 
EWCA 92 (CA); R (on the Application of Tony Nicklinson and another) v Ministry of 
Justice [2014]). Yet, bioethics’ academic orators – ‘bioethicists’ – are seldom heard 
(James, 2008: 68). Even when exceptions are made, so too are errors. In 2000, in 
Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147, the Court of 
Appeal contemplated the surgical separation of conjoined twins: to do so would 
immediately mean the death of the weaker twin; but not to do so would apparently 
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mean the death of both girls within a matter of months. Favourable references were 
made to John Keown’s (1997) work on the sanctity of life, which the court seemed 
inclined to apply. Yet, in the event, the judges’ reasoning owed more to an ethic that 
is most concerned with judging the quality (rather than the inviolability) of life and is 
thus quite at odds with the one Keown espouses (Huxtable, 2002).  
 
Of course, this is not to say that medical law is entirely divorced from medical ethics. 
Even leaving aside jurisprudential questions about whether law (in principle) involves 
a moral commitment, the ethical dimensions of law (in fact) are inescapable. 
Sometimes the judges are relatively open about (and to) this: Lord Coleridge CJ 
famously stated that ‘It would not be correct to say that every moral obligation 
involves a legal duty; but every legal duty is founded on a moral obligation’ (R v. 
Instan (1893) 1 QB 450, 453). Equally, the courts are not averse to receiving direct 
inputs on ‘formal’ and ‘semi-formal’ (Miola, 2004: 253) medical ethics from 
professional organisations like the General Medical Council (e.g. W v. Egdell [1990] 
Ch 359, 390-2, 412-4, 416, 420-3). Less commonly, judges may engage with critical 
medical ethics, as did Butler Sloss P (as she was then) in her endorsement of 
respect for the gravely disabled patient’s subjective experience of her condition in B 
v. NHS Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam), para 94 (cf. Atkins 2000). Note also 
Hoffmann LJ’s more critical ethical approach in the Court of Appeal in Bland, in 
which the judges agreed that clinically assisted nutrition and hydration could be 
withdrawn from a patient in a persistent vegetative state (Airedale NHS Trust v Bland 
[1993] 1 AC 789, 824-34). But other times, as we see in Re A, the judges are less 
open: Ward LJ insisted that ‘this is a court of law, not of morals’ ([2000] 4 All ER 961, 
969), albeit before then proceeding to analyse (but misapply) the sanctity of life 
position in considerable detail. It seems that, no matter what the judges say, medical 
law is replete with the ‘stigmata cases’ to which Lee and Morgan have referred i.e. 
cases that ‘require courts to develop a social, even a moral vision with which to 
respond to the dilemmas created by the social and cultural revolution of 
contemporary medicine’ (Lee and Morgan, 2001: 298).  
 
The ‘moral vision’ will occasionally be clear to all, such as when direct appeals are 
made to the aforementioned sanctity of life or to the principle of respect for 
autonomy. Yet, even when the moral vision is clouded – and the ruling in question 
more technical and correspondingly ‘de-moralised’ – it can usually be detected 
(Montgomery, 2006). For example, in Dr Arthur’s trial we see hints of the Bolam 
standard, borrowed from the civil law of clinical negligence, which holds that a 
defendant is not negligent if he or she has acted in accordance with a responsible 
body of medical opinion (Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 
WLR 582). The standard has long had a strangle-hold on medical law. This might 
appear to be a descriptive paradigm, according to which an individual clinician’s 
behaviour is compared or contrasted with that of his peers. But this inevitably 
involves an ethical judgment: it is, therefore, also an evaluative standard, premised 
on the idea that one ought to do what one’s ‘responsible’ peers would do. The judges 
have recently sought to remind defendants that they (not the defendants) will be the 
ultimate arbiters of responsible practice (Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority 
[1997] 4 All ER 771). But whoever does the judging, the standard unavoidably 




On this view, (bio)ethics does indeed enter law, both overtly and covertly. Indeed, 
like Miola, one might view ethics and law as united in a ‘symbiotic’ relationship 
(Miola, 2007). But does the reverse hold? In other words, how, if at all, does law 
enter bioethics?  
 
The voice of law in bioethics? 
There are three legal locations in particular from which law’s voice has projected into 
bioethics: the products, processes and practices of law (Huxtable, 2015). First, the 
products of law, as they pertain to the biosciences, will undoubtedly make a 
considerable contribution to bioethics and its development. Law can, therefore, 
provide some of the raw materials with which bioethicists will work. There will be 
rulings, statutes and codes that have a direct and specific bearing on an issue of 
bioethical import, such as when a jurisdiction seeks to govern the uses of human 
tissue, practices in reproductive medicine, or physician assisted dying. There are, of 
course, many more examples that could be cited. Very often, as we suggested 
above, the legal materials in question will adopt a particular principled position. As 
Callahan has suggested, law is ‘ready to take on ethics if that is what gets served up 
to it for the making of decisions’ (Callahan, 1996: 34). Bioethicists will, 
understandably, seek to reflect critically on such developments. Sometimes the 
judges will even advance ethical practice, such as when a clinician’s 
recommendation of the creation of clinical ethics committees was endorsed by the 
New Jersey Supreme Court adjudicating on the fate of Karen Ann Quinlan (In re 
Quinlan (1976) NJ 355 A 2d 647). As Spielman (2007: 41) observes, this 
‘endorsement provided a crucial boost to the fledgling ethics committee movement’. 
There will also be a plethora of other rules and regulations not directly aimed at the 
biosciences whose influence is nevertheless felt. Although medical (or, more 
broadly, health care) law is nowadays a recognised body of law in its own right, it 
continues to gain sustenance from its roots in criminal law, tort law, public law, 
human rights law and European Community law, amongst others. Sometimes, 
retracing (and even redrawing) these roots will help the parties to navigate their way 
out of bioethical difficulty (e.g. R (on the application of Watts) v Secretary of State for 
Health [2003] EWHC 2228/[2004] EWCA Civ 166, Malette v Shulman (1990) 67 DLR 
(4th) 321 (Ont CA), Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 2 WLR 316 and Re A 
(Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147).  
 
Secondly, law makes a distinctive contribution to bioethics in its insistence on due 
process. Commenting on the United States, Jonsen (1998: 343) cites Annas’ claim 
that: 
 
American bioethics has been driven by the law... The stress on autonomy and 
self determination comes from our Bill of Rights, our Declaration of 
Independence and the whole common law tradition. And law’s primary 
contribution to bioethics is procedural. Lawyers are expert at procedure. The 
common law itself is based on deciding individual cases and using these 
cases as the basis of creating law. Bioethics has adopted this technique. In 
the United States, with its pluralism of beliefs and people, the law is what 
holds us together. There is no other ethos... 
 
His comments chime with experiences elsewhere. Casuistry – case-based reasoning 
– is a method also adopted by bioethical practitioners outside the US (Ashcroft et al, 
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2005). Indeed, the influence of law here should not be surprising, as bioethics is a 
wide multi- and inter-disciplinary discipline, whose practitioners have long included 
lawyers (Schneider, 1994). We see this not only in the pages of specialist journals, 
but also in bioethics’ more overtly practice-orientated and public-facing endeavours, 
such as the work of national organisations like the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (e.g. 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2006). Despite such input, there are some who believe 
that the lessons of the law should be better heeded in bioethical practice. In the UK, 
for example, Sheila McLean has appealed to the due process associated with legal 
proceedings in her critique of clinical ethics services. In this jurisdiction, research 
ethics committees are formally constituted and regulated (a development which 
owes much to the European Union’s European Clinical Trials Directive 2001/20/EC) 
but clinical ethics committees, from which advice may be issued on cases of ethical 
complexity, remain relatively ad hoc, despite their growing number (75 by 2007) 
(Larcher, Slowther and Watson, 2010). McLean (2008) perceives a ‘due process 
wasteland’, which she believes would be best re-developed by architects schooled in 
pertinent principles of law. 
 
Thirdly, law’s intrinsic connection to practice enables it to make a distinctive 
contribution to bioethics. In the words of Lon Fuller (1969: 96), law is ‘the enterprise 
of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules’. In its preoccupation with 
human conduct, law can therefore provide a real world testing ground for concepts 
and approaches in bioethics. ‘Moral philosophers are not obliged day by day to solve 
the real problems of real people’, notes Birks (2000: 2-3), ‘nor are they called to daily 
account to justify to those same real people the substance of their tenets and the 
even handedness of their procedures’. Bioethics is, by its nature, also a practice-
facing endeavour, such that it is not wholly beholden to the sometimes abstracting 
theorising of moral philosophy. However, for many, bioethics remains essentially 
tethered to this branch of philosophy, since it involves ‘the systematic study of the 
moral dimensions – including moral vision, decisions, conduct, and policies – of the 
life sciences and health care, employing a variety of ethical methodologies in an 
interdisciplinary setting’ (Reich 1995: xxi ). Legal officials like the judges, meanwhile, 
must often do more than study, deliberate or theorise – they must decide. And, 
McLean (2007: 196) continues, ‘irrespective of the ethical views of decision-makers 
– legal or medical – there are rules under which they must operate, like it or not. 
Whether or not they are based on moral obligations ... they nonetheless are superior 
(in practical terms) to the outcome predicted by adherents to one ethical school of 
thought or another’. What law thus offers to bioethics is the crucible of experience: a 
space in which action-directed theories and approaches can be tested. 
 
Law’s voice has therefore projected into bioethics, correspondingly influencing its 
theoretical and practical expressions. But that does not mean that each can fully 
hear the other’s voice; to borrow Carl Schneider’s (2004) terminology, we should be 
wary of those limits that ‘crimp the usefulness of law's language as a vehicle for 
bioethical discourse’. Three particular limits – concerning angst, action and 
aspiration – suggest that we should be cautious.  
 
First, when we mention angst, we mean to refer to the adversarial process that is 
central to law, at least as it is associated with court proceedings. Certainly bioethics 
will often engage with conflict, whether between principles, positions or parties. But 
bioethics need not resolve such conflicts in an all-or-nothing fashion; law courts, 
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however, tend to position parties as adversaries and ultimately to divide them into 
winner and loser (Meller and Barclay, 2011: 619). We see this quite vividly in the trial 
of Dr Arthur, in which he appears to emerge victorious, over both the prosecutors 
and, some might say, John Pearson. Even the judges have appreciated that this 
model is not wholly suited to addressing the dilemmas that can arise for patients and 
the professionals caring for them (e.g. Portsmouth NHS Trust v Wyatt [2005] EWCA 
Civ 1181, per Wall LJ, para. 86). 
 
Secondly, in its preoccupation with action and with rules, law seems likely to miss 
other pieces of the moral jigsaw. The ‘native language’ of bioethics is much richer 
than law’s, as one might expect, given its wider reach; as Schneider (1994) says, 
bioethics contemplates ‘the most basic and intractable issues about human life and 
the most intricate and intimate issues about human relationships’, with the result that 
‘a rich vocabulary of ethical considerations, styles, and approaches is necessary’. 
Although there will be areas of agreement, it is likely there is no lingua franca for 
bioethics, and this need not be a bad thing per se (Derse, 2000). Nor should we 
expect this, Pluralistic contemporary societies lack a common conception of the 
good; there is, for example, no shared moral consensus on the meaning of 
beneficence. Indeed, Engelhardt (1996) argues that the only lingua franca for 
modern bioethics is the language of consent.  
 
Of course, some of the rich vocabulary of bioethics, including the language of 
consent, will be amenable to translation into the language of law: action-directed 
approaches, like consequentialism and deontology, appear so amenable, particularly 
the latter, given its concern with duties and rights. Yet, other words might be lost; for 
example, law will struggle to express the values associated with virtue, character and 
emotion. Some suggest that action and character can be related (e.g. Feldman 
2000; van Zyl 2002; Solum 2003), but Slote (1995: 91) observes that, ‘[b]ecause 
virtue ethics is supposed to concentrate more on the inner life of the individual than 
either consequentialism or deontology, one can easily wonder whether the former is 
really capable of doing justice to law or to any sort of objective or real constraint 
upon human action’. 
 
The constraints to which Slote refers give rise to the third area of concern, regarding 
the aspirations of bioethics, of which law will often fall short. In the words of Mark 
Twain, ‘Laws control the lesser man... Right conduct controls the greater one’. Law, 
on this account, is more often concerned with minimal standards, rather than high 
level aspirations. The English case law pertaining to ‘informed’ consent was long a 
case in point, because the judges effectively signalled that doctors could disclose 
what other doctors in their position would disclose – not necessarily what the patient 
wanted to know (Fovargue and Miola, 2010). Here, as elsewhere, Bolam appeared 
to reign supreme. Although the jurisprudence in this area is now developing along 
more robustly pro-autonomy lines (e.g. Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41), we might 
still doubt that the judges have given due critical attention to the model(s) of 
autonomy they seek to defend (Coggon, 2007). Indeed, it is not difficult to detect 
inconsistent approaches throughout medical law, with some such inconsistencies 
attributable to a failure to attend to the ethical dimensions of the given problem (e.g. 




Perhaps law’s failures are forgivable and explicable, given the aforementioned 
absence of a bioethical lingua franca. If only autonomy and non-interference 
command a consensus in bioethics, then it should not be surprising – and may even 
be commendable – that law seeks, at a minimum, to give effect to such liberal ideals. 
Of course, as we indicated previously, the ethical lexicon cannot be reduced to these 
concerns and neither is there bioethical consensus on how such ideas are to be 
understood. There are, therefore, ongoing challenges for bioethics, in ensuring its 
lexicon is appropriately rich and in generating the most robust ethical models. The 
challenge for law, meanwhile, involves setting the (ethical) bar at the appropriate 
height. Given the nature of law, coupled with the ethical dissensus to which we have 
referred, we suspect that law is likely to set the bar a few rungs lower than it might 
be set by some critical bioethicists.  
 
Bioethics is, after all, ‘a critical discipline’, says Brownsword (2008): ‘bioethics tries to 
sort out the moral wheat from the non-moral chaff’. As Dawson and Wilkinson (2009: 
36) elaborate, philosophical practical ethics comprises: ‘appraisal of ethical 
arguments using the techniques of analytic philosophy’; ‘conceptual analysis, which 
seeks to clarify and explain the role of particular ethical concepts and terms’; and 
‘the formulation and critical assessment of ethical principles or normative theories 
about how we should behave’. Logical analysis – and thus clarity and consistency – 
seems to play an important role in this endeavour (e.g. Pollock, 1998). Similar 
analytical approaches might, of course, be adopted by legal scholars, such as those 
inquiring into the requirements associated with the ‘internal morality of law’ or the 
‘Rule of Law’ (see Brazier and Ost, 2013: chapter 8).  
 
Although there will be areas of overlap (including overlapping concerns with 
consistency and the like), the standards and requirements of law and bioethics will 
nevertheless continue to differ. We have suggested that, whilst each undoubtedly 
influences and enriches the other, bioethics and law have different voices and speak 
different languages. Implicit in some of what we have said here might appear to be 
the idea that the two must inevitably remain in competition, clamouring to be loudest. 
However, this need not be the case, as we will explore in the next section. 
 
Different voices, different stories?   
The voices of bioethics and law can sound different and sometimes dissonant 
because of the presence of interpretation in both fields. Often the cases involving 
bioethical conflict are ones in which we engage in narrative thinking in order to reach 
comprehension. According to Bruner (1996b: 39), ‘[t]here appear to be two broad 
ways in which human beings organize and manage their knowledge of the world... 
one seems more specialized for treating of physical “things,” the other for treating of 
people and their plights. These are conventionally known as logical scientific thinking 
and narrative thinking...’. We suggested, above, that law and bioethics will 
sometimes tend towards logical approaches and appraisals. But these might not be 
entirely appropriate concerns; instead we might find it more fitting to rely on narrative 
discourse to make sense of cases involving people and their plights, such as the end 
of life, abortion and the selling of organs. In bioethics, this is the domain of narrative 
ethics, the exploration of meaning and interpretation of human events, of narrative 
knowledge, construction and storytelling in bioethics, which can involve embracing 




According to this view, the voices of bioethics and law are involved in the process of 
narrative discourse, offering meanings, solutions and challenges that are subject to 
interpretation throughout the story. The role of interpretation is important here, for 
interpretation is an essential element in the narratives that the voices of bioethics 
and law play a part in shaping.  
 
As we noted earlier, some of the decisions taken by the courts may appear to be 
illogical and fail to harmonise the voices of bioethics and the law. But there is a 
reason for this. Charon (1994: 272) highlights the existence of differing 
interpretations in bioethics, noting that ethical issues regularly come to light because 
of a conflict between the interpretations of an issue and the available actions. When 
the law intervenes, a conflict in interpretations of the ethical issue often exists and 
the law attempts to resolve the case, although it can only do so in the specific legal 
context. So the application of law in Re A resolved the legal dilemma presented by 
the bioethical conflict that the precipitating event gave rise to – whether benefiting 
one twin or not harming the other should take priority.  
 
When law is applied to bioethical dilemmas, the ethical issue must be interpreted 
and translated into legal discourse, principles and concepts in order to (legally) 
resolve the case. Thus, we observe Brooke LJ moulding the case before him into 
one in which the doctrine of necessity could apply, to justify operating on the 
conjoined twins and thereby kill Mary (Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical 
Separation) [2001] Fam 147, 219-240). And judges interpret the case law in light of 
the ethical dilemma before them: the defence of necessity had never before been 
available in response to a case involving the deliberate ending of life (R v. Dudley 
and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273; R v. Howe [1987] AC 417). Brooke LJ interpreted 
the criminal law jurisprudence surrounding necessity to involve policy considerations 
not present in Re A, which therefore made it an exceptional case. It was not a case 
where one person was being a judge in his own cause of the value of his life, nor 
one in which allowing necessity to justify the taking of an innocent life would cause 
the law to be absolutely divorced from morality (Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: 
Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147, 239). So interpreted, necessity could be an 
available defence, thereby differentiating the case before him from previous cases. 
Thus, Brooke LJ chose an interpretation that responded to the specific and unique 
elements in the case, a reflection of Dworkin’s ‘law as integrity’ thesis (Dworkin, 
1998: 238-9).  
 
Through his interpretation and application of law-lore, Brooke LJ became a co-author 
of the story of criminal law; the case before him became a chapter of this story. His 
translation of ethical conflict into a legal story involving necessity offered a resolution. 
Thus, even in such hard cases, although the task of finding a resolution is especially 
taxing, it has still proven possible for judges to find, interpret and apply a legal 
principle such as necessity that apparently offers the least detrimental outcome. 
 
Turning to bioethics, ethicists and health care lawyers interpret real life situations into 
substantive ethical controversies, interpreting a factual situation and framing the 
ethical theories and principles to tackle the situation. Thus, for example, a case 
involving the donation of a man’s organs on the condition that they would go to a 
white recipient is presented as an ethical controversy of autonomy versus justice 
(Department of Health, 2000; Cronin and Price, 2008). Following a hospital’s refusal 
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to provide in vitro fertilisation treatment to a woman (R v. Ethical Committee of St 
Mary’s Hospital (Manchester), ex p Harriott [1988] 1 FLR 512), her former status as 
a prostitute is emphasised in the bioethical and health care law literature. The case 
can thereby be narrated as an ethical controversy involving reproductive autonomy 
versus discrimination (Freeman, 1988: 3; Brahams, 1990: 857). Whilst this may 
narrow the bioethical debate, such narrowing might be necessary to enable a legal 
decision to be reached. This suggests that some sort of compromise is necessary to 
enable law and bioethics to work in harmony. Interpretation is thus crucial in 
ensuring the evolvement of narratives that construct the reality, which the voices of 
bioethics and law help shape, and in facilitating congruence between the two 
disciplines. It is therefore highly unlikely that there will be one generic interpretation 




Practitioners of bioethics and of law can speak in different voices and will sometimes 
tell very different stories. Occasionally, as one can detect in some depictions of 
widely-publicised and dramatic court proceedings, legal officials will be willing to hear 
what bioethic(ist)s have to say, citing some principle or other as a means of resolving 
the case at hand. Equally, one can also detect bioethics’ reception of law’s concerns, 
when the former field addresses what law has to say on a substantive matter of 
moral import, or problems of process. But any dialogue (such as it is) is unlikely to be 
entirely mutually enriching. Law courts are adversarial arenas, in which ethical 
nuance and laudable aspirations might lose out in the quest to determine a victor; 
legal answers tend also to be directed towards action, rather than concerns about 
character, virtue and the like that might be voiced in the bioethical forum. As such, 
when faced with questions associated with moral conflict, law and bioethics are 
capable of replying as one, but their answers can also be discordant and can speak 
past one another. Practitioners in each field need not despair, however. Rather, we 
suspect that there will be much to be gained from recognising that each has their 
own story to tell, guided by their own narrative norms. Neither can necessarily claim 
superiority or access to the ‘truth’ of the matter. However, each will be likely to gain 
greater insight by opening a dialogue with the other, telling and re-telling the story, 
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